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Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is 
Testimonial Injustice?
Raymond Auerback
Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
ABSTRACT
In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda Frickerargues 
that there is a distinctly epistemic kind of injustice, which she calls testimonial 
injustice, resulting from identity-prejudicial credibility deficit – identity prejudic caus-
ing a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word. Sheargues 
that testimonial injustice is correctable through hearers developing a capacity for 
self-correcting for it within a virtue-epistemological framework. In this essay, 
I examine Fricker’s argument, and conclude that Fricker’s exposition of identity- 
prejudicial credibility deficit is sound, but that she has not demonstrated either that 
testimonial injustice is a distinctly testimonial phenomenon or that identity- 
prejudicial credibility deficit is a distinctly epistemic phenomenon, or how a virtue- 
epistemic framework might be successfully employed as a corrective methodology. 
I further suggest that her conception of testimony as distinctly evidential is too 
narrow to be applied to everyday instances of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, 
and should be reconfigured within a broader framework.
KEYWORDS Testimony; prejudice; injustice; virtue theory
1. What is Testimonial Injustice?
In her book Epistemic Injustice (2007), Miranda Fricker argues that there is 
a specifically epistemic kind of injustice, which consists in wronging some-
body in their capacity as a knower, and that one form of epistemic injustice is 
testimonial injustice, which occurs ‘when prejudice causes a hearer to give 
a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word’ (Fricker 2007, 1).1 She refers 
to this prejudice as ‘identity prejudice’ because it is based on the identity of 
the speaker as a ‘social type’ – someone socially stereotyped by the hearer, for 
example by virtue of their race, gender or ethnicity. Fricker thus defines such 
instances of testimonial injustice as instances of ‘identity-prejudicial cred-
ibility deficit’. She distinguishes them from instances of what she calls 
‘epistemic bad luck’ – cases in which the hearer reasonably misjudges the 
speaker’s words or body language, such as by interpreting his avoiding eye 
contact with her as a sign of his insincerity, when it is actually a sign of the 
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speaker’s shyness. Both cases, she says, result in the credibility of the speaker 
being deflated by the hearer, but in the case of testimonial injustice the 
speaker is also epistemically ‘wronged’ by the hearer (41–42).
It is possible, says Fricker, for a speaker to be given excess, as well as 
deflated epistemic credit as a result of identity prejudice which carries an 
epistemic ‘social charge’. An example might be a speaker having an accent 
which implies she has a ‘creditworthy’ educational or social background 
(though the ’wrong’ kind of accent might equally cause the speaker’s cred-
ibility to be reduced in the mind of the hearer). Fricker states that she is 
concerned only with cases of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, but I will 
argue that this is not in fact the case.
Testimonial injustice, says Fricker, is especially harmful where the identity 
prejudice that informs it amounts to social stereotyping, which she 
defines as:
a widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more 
attributes [. . .] [which] displays some (typically epistemically culpable) resis-
tance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment (35).
Such widely accepted social prejudices, Fricker declares, are antithetical to 
the dissemination of truths, freedom of speech and the spread of knowledge 
and also constitute ethical wrongs against speakers whose credibility is 
deflated, because they are degraded not only qua knowers, but also qua 
human beings. I would argue, though, that it is more likely that it is socially 
stereotyping speakers as humans that leads to their credibility as knowers 
being deflated.
Fricker notes that a secondary effect of negative identity-prejudicial stereo-
typing may be that speakers whose credibility is deflated by others may suffer 
a loss of confidence in themselves as knowers, or in their authority as speakers, 
and become too quick to give up their own beliefs when challenged, or accept 
too uncritically the opinions of others. More radically, they may begin to see 
themselves as others see them, or seek to conform to the stereotypical image 
imposed on them by others. One example of such pernicious self-stereotyping 
is that recounted by the Canadian philosopher Karyn L. Freedman, who was 
violently raped as a young woman and subsequently wrote an account of her 
experience and its aftermath in her book, One Hour In Paris. Freedman 
recalled how she did not relate her experience, other than to her closest family 
and friends, until almost a decade after the event, largely because she had 
assimilated the ‘dominant world view’ that the world was only unsafe for 
women who were not ‘sufficiently careful or intelligent’. Thus, she feared 
disclosure might lead to her being judged to have contributed to, or even 
collaborated in, the assault on her. (Freedman 2014) Probably the most 
notorious historical example of collective ‘self-fulfilling’ racial stereotyping is 
that of German Jews who were bombarded with viciously degrading and 
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dehumanizing images of themselves by the Nazi media during the 1930s. The 
‘surrender’ of Jews in Germany and elsewhere to this stereotypical image of 
themselves, said the Austrian philosopher, essayist, and Holocaust survivor 
Jean Améry, was no moral failure, but simply the acknowledgment of a social 
reality. ‘This, so they must have told themselves’ he said, ‘is how the world sees 
us, as lazy, ugly, useless and evil; in view of such universal agreement what 
sense does it still make to object and say that we are not that way!’ (Améry 
1999, 87).2 Thus, I am in agreement with Fricker’s contention that social 
stereotyping exists, or even that it is widespread, but this does not of course 
imply that it necessarily results in credibility deflation.
Correcting for testimonial injustice, says Fricker, means an epistemic 
agent training herself to be a ‘responsible’ hearer – to ‘match the level of 
credibility she attributes to her interlocutor to the evidence that he is offering 
the truth’ (Fricker 2007, 19, my emphasis).
Fricker’s illustration of testimonial injustice in practice revolves around 
two fictional cases. The first is contained in Harper Lee’s much acclaimed 
1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird, set in a courtroom in Maycomb County, 
Alabama, in 1935, which Fricker describes as a work of ‘historically truthful 
fiction’. A black man, Tom Robinson, is on trial charged with raping and 
beating a white girl, Mayella Ewell. ‘It is obvious to the reader’, says Fricker, 
‘and to any relatively unprejudiced person in the courtroom, that Tom 
Robinson is entirely innocent’ (23). There is compelling evidence, for 
instance, that Tom would have been physically incapable of beating the 
girl. However, any rational evaluation of the evidence is rendered impossible 
by the all-white jury’s prejudice against Tom as a ‘Negro’. They cannot 
believe his assertion, for example, that it was Mayella who had tried to kiss 
him, because the possibility that a white girl may have tried to kiss a black 
man – as was in fact the case – was simply unthinkable. Faced with the 
epistemic reality, within the larger social reality of racial prejudice, that 
whether or not he tells the truth he will not be believed and will be found 
guilty, Tom runs away, thus ‘proving’ his guilt in the eyes of his white 
accusers. The jury’s prejudiced perception of Tom, notes Fricker, pervades 
many aspects of their reaction to his evidence. For example, his truthful 
assertion that he had helped out Mayella to do odd jobs around the house 
because he felt sorry for her transgresses their innate belief in white super-
iority, since the notion that a black person might feel sympathy for a white 
person, and thus by implication feel a sense of superiority towards her, 
appears to them incredible, and confirms them in their view that he is 
a liar. The jury’s duty, on the basis of the evidence, is clearly to acquit 
Tom, but their racial prejudice overpowers any sense of duty, and thus 
Tom becomes the victim of testimonial injustice.
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Fricker’s second illustration is also fictional – Anthony Minghella’a 
screenplay for The Talented Mr Ripley, based on Patricia Highsmith’s novel 
and set in Venice in the 1950s. Herbert Greenleaf, a rich American indus-
trialist, is visiting the city in order to investigate the whereabouts of his son, 
Dickie, who is engaged to Marge Sherwood, but has mysteriously disap-
peared after spending time travelling with his ‘friend’ Tom Ripley. Ripley 
encourages Greenleaf to believe Dickie has run away and possibly committed 
suicide, but Marge comes to believe, correctly, that Ripley has murdered him. 
Though when Marge expresses her distrust of Ripley and her disbelief of 
Ripley’s story, Greenleaf, to whom ‘Ripley has done a successful job of 
sucking up’ silences her, mistakenly ‘pathologizing’ her assertion that 
Dickie would not kill himself to be ‘a sweetheart’s wishful thinking’ 
(Fricker 2007, 87). He even ignores the key piece of evidence, that Marge 
has found Dickie’s rings at Ripley’s place, including one from her he had 
sworn never to remove, responding with a ‘familiar put-down’: ‘Marge, 
there’s female intuition and then there are the facts’ (88). Her truthful 
assertions simply convince Greenleaf, as a result of his social stereotyping 
of her, of the rationality of his belief that Marge’s account is untrustworthy. 
The viewer, however, knows that Marge is right. Ripley has successfully 
exploited Greenleaf’s adherence to contemporary prejudicial attitudes 
towards women among men of his age and social background to make him 
disbelieve Marge, a fact to which Greenleaf himself is blind. This is therefore 
another case of testimonial injustice, but Fricker ultimately deems Greenleaf 
non-culpable in his prejudice, because his prejudicial stereotyping of Marge 
is so ingrained as to be unconscious. Tom’s jurors, on the other hand, she 
finds culpable for not believing Tom due to their refusal to take into account 
any of the compelling evidence presented by his white legal counsel, Atticus 
Finch, that Tom was telling the truth. In fact, they deliver their verdict in 
defiance of, and perhaps even partly as a consequence of being provoked by, 
the pleas of Finch to set aside their prejudices about Negroes and ‘do their 
duty’ to judge Tom solely based on the evidence.
Fricker next considers the possibility of correcting for identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficit. Correctability, she finds, requires the hearer to have both 
a sensibility towards the presence of identity-prejudicial influences affecting 
her evaluation of the speaker, and the will and ability to engage corrective 
epistemic virtues in order to try to neutralize them. One way to develop such 
virtues, Fricker suggests, is through familiarization. Epistemic agents who are 
prejudiced against a particular accent, for example, may be able, with regular 
exposure to hearing the testimony of speakers with that accent, to come to 
associate it with a speaker’s trustworthiness (though of course such exposure 
could equally confirm their prejudicial view). The ideal outcome, she sug-
gests, would be somehow to condition the hearer’s sensibility, through 
experience, to be able to recognize the possible danger of his forming an 
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identity-prejudicial evaluation of the speaker’s credibility and to correct for it 
spontaneously, so that the hearer’s evaluation emerges ‘ready-corrected’. 
However, since such an ideal is unlikely to be realized in practice across 
a range of identity prejudices, Fricker concedes that corrective action may 
require a certain amount of reflective application, in tandem with a degree of 
spontaneity. She suggests that to the extent one thereby succeeds in correct-
ing for the relevant identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, one has acquired 
the virtue of testimonial justice.
2. How Can One Account and Correct for Testimonial Injustice 
within an Epistemic Framework?
Propositional telling – someone telling someone else that p – says Fricker, ‘is 
the parent case of testimonial injustice, since the basic wrong of testimonial 
injustice is the undermining of the speaker qua knower’, and conveying 
information is the ‘most basic and immediate point of telling’ (Fricker 
2007, 60).3 Therefore, ‘the epistemology of testimony is the relevant frame-
work within which to place all cases of prejudicial credibility deficit’ (61). 
Consequently, we need to be able to account and correct for testimonial 
injustice within an epistemological evaluatory framework.
Fricker first examines the two most historically important candidate 
accounts of belief justification and knowledge acquisition: the reductionist 
account and the non-reductionist account, also sometimes called the anti- 
reductionist account. The reductionist account is the classic inferentialist 
account, which requires testimonial utterances to be inductively verified by 
the hearer, whilst the non-reductionist account is the classic non- 
inferentialist account, which grants the hearer a presumptive right, or 
a priori entitlement (depending on which version is followed) to accept the 
speaker’s word as a default position, in the absence of contrary evidence. She 
rejects the reductionist account, primarily on the widely accepted ground 
that its requirement that all testimony must be verified inductively is imprac-
ticable, and also not reflective of how we evaluate the vast majority of 
everyday testimonial encounters in practice. Fricker’s rejection of reduction-
ism is conceptually logical, since the notion that all testimony should be 
inductively verified is clearly contrary to the basic thrust of her argument that 
belief in testimony is situated in a hearer’s personal evaluation of the testifier 
rather than the subject matter of her testimony. It is, though, an objection 
typically registered against global reductionism, which is the traditionally 
espoused Humean form of reductionism, rather than its more widely 
accepted contemporary form, known as local reductionism. The latter 
requires only that, in the case of each particular testimonial utterance, the 
relevant speaker’s word should be verified through the hearer’s face-to face 
evaluation of the that speaker, supported by any background evidence 
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available to the hearer. One has to assume, though, that Fricker also rejects 
local reductionism and I can see two grounds for her doing so. The first is 
that local reductionism has no starting point of trust in the word of the 
speaker and so is not specifically anti-prejudicial. The second is that it does 
not envisage hearers having any epistemically specific training for their task 
of monitoring the speaker. As Elizabeth Fricker (1994, 1995) makes clear in 
her widely quoted account of local reductionism, hearers are not required to 
possess or cultivate particular epistemic virtues. They are simply encouraged 
to evaluate the speaker’s sincerity and competence, as evidenced by her 
‘beliefs, desires, and other mental states and character traits’, by employing 
‘commonsense psychology or person-theory’, though this might, in the case 
of the ‘right’ hearer, include virtues necessary or beneficial for successful 
epistemic evaluation, such as open-mindedness, attentiveness, rationality 
and so forth. (Fricker 1994, 148–149)
On the other hand, Miranda Fricker raises no conceptual objection to 
either leading version of modern non-reductionism: that formulated by C.A. 
J. Coady4 and that formulated by Tyler Burge.5 It is not wholly clear that she 
endorses them, but arguably this can be assumed from the fact that their 
default starting position of a presumption of trust in (Coady) or an entitle-
ment to accept the speaker’s word, as long as what she says is intelligible 
(Burge) is wholly consistent with her conception of a testimonially just 
hearer. Fricker claims, however, that non-reductionism is wrong in perceiv-
ing that the critical faculties of speakers are in ‘snooze’ (critically unreflec-
tive) mode unless and until alerted by some ‘cue for doubt’, when a mental 
‘shift of gear’ sends them into ‘critical’ mode. In reality, she contends, our 
critical antennae are never wholly switched off, but are in a constant mode of 
‘critical openness’ to the word of others and are always alert for signs or cues 
which might alter our view, in one direction or another, of how far to trust 
the speaker. (Fricker 2007, 66) I am not sure of her grounds for making this 
claim, since I perceive non-reductionism as simply creating normative enti-
tlements to trust speakers, but I can see why she makes it, namely in support 
of an argument that correcting for anti-prejudicial credibility deficit requires 
critical openness. A state of critical openness, in turn, I assume the argument 
goes, requires the adoption of virtue-epistemological methodology in order 
to ‘wake up’ snoozing hearers.
Fricker’s chosen epistemological methodology for cultivating responsible 
hearers is thus to pursue a ‘virtue epistemological account of testimony’. 
Virtue epistemology, unlike both reductionism and non-reductionism, pre-
sents as a specifically epistemic agent-centred account, the basic idea under-
pinning which is that ‘knowledge is true belief that is gained as a result of the 
reliable operation of [the agent’s] epistemic virtues or cognitive faculties’ 
(Pritchard 2014, 58). Cognitive faculties in this context are natural, or innate 
faculties, like perception, intuition, and memory, whilst epistemic virtues are 
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‘cultivated’ character traits like conscientiousness, intellectual and moral 
courage, and open-mindedness. The idea of knowledge being acquired 
through learned cognitive virtues is an old one. Linda Zagzebski observes 
that it can be traced back to Plato’s notion of episteme (’knowledge’ or 
‘understanding’) which he associated with techne – practical human arts or 
skills acquired in fields as diverse as medicine, shipbuilding and cooking – 
and also Aristotle’s notion of epistemic virtues which must be learned over 
time, like those of builders, or musicians (Zagzebski 2001, 240). Virtue 
theory in effect builds on this idea by giving the notion of these learned 
practical skills a moral dimension, as intellectual virtues. In the context of 
virtue epistemology, Fricker sees this as her notion of a ‘responsible hearer’ – 
one who is suitably trained or socially educated to ‘see the world in moral 
colour’, and to exercise ‘rational sensibility, without inference, so as to be 
critically open to the word of others’ (Fricker 2007, 71). It is not possible, 
within the length or scope of this essay to do full justice to Fricker’s carefully 
worked through portrayal of a responsible, or virtuous, hearer. I would 
briefly summarize it in a testimonial context, though, as that of a hearer 
who possesses the capacity to recognize cues relating to trustworthiness, 
which enable her to make correct, non-prejudicial judgements concerning 
the credibility of testifiers – for example about their sincerity. The concept of 
the virtuous hearer, adds Fricker, embraces attitudes which are both intel-
lectual and emotional. A perception of a speaker as trustworthy, for example, 
contains a feeling of trust in her. Her virtuous hearer would thus aim, over 
time, to develop both a critical reflexive awareness of identity-prejudicial 
stereotyping, and the means to neutralize it. She acknowledges that the 
ability to issue assessments of speakers ‘ready-corrected’ for identity- 
prejudicial credibility deficit would in practice be hard to achieve due to 
‘the psychologically stealthy and historically dynamic nature of prejudice’ 
and its ‘powerful visceral force’ (98). Indeed, she accepts that some identity 
prejudices, such as those relating to colour or gender, may be so historically 
and socio-culturally embedded that any resulting testimonial injustice 
should be considered, in effect, non-culpable (as in the case of Herbert 
Greenleaf), due to there being no collective social consciousness of the 
relevant identity-prejudice as an epistemic shortcoming. On the other 
hand, she adds, if a collective consciousness of a previously unconscious 
identity prejudice subsequently emerges, individuals who are guilty of con-
tinuing to make identity-prejudicial credibility judgements may then become 
considered to be culpably prejudiced.
Virtue epistemology is not without its critics; some commentators, for 
example, hold that it cannot account for cases of ‘epistemic luck’,6 in 
which justified or true beliefs are acquired by chance. However, two 
specific issues arise in the context of its utility as a framework for 
correcting for identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. The first is how far 
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it is possible in the real world to aim for correcting irrational and some-
times deeply embedded prejudices in oneself through some kind of 
rationally acquired ‘virtuous’ process. The second is why, even if this 
can be done, an epistemic agent would need a virtue-epistemological 
framework to achieve it, rather than applying general moral, intellectual, 
and social virtues, such as reasonableness, fairness and intellectual hon-
esty. In this light, it seems to me that there are two key capacities, which 
virtue epistemologists need to demonstrate that virtue epistemology pos-
sesses, which other epistemological accounts do not. The first is 
a particular capacity to train epistemic agents to develop the requisite 
heightened levels of awareness of the operation of identity prejudice 
within themselves and others, and the second is a particular capacity to 
equip epistemic agents with some specific methodological tools to correct 
for such prejudices.
3. The Issues Concerning Testimonial Injustice
I will assume for the purposes of the remainder of this essay that it is not 
disputed that identity-prejudicial credibility deficit exists as a phenomenon, 
which is present within many, if not most, societies. On the basis of that 
assumption, it seems to me that the field of possible objections, which have 
been raised to the notion of identifying and correcting for epistemic injustice 
and specifically testimonial injustice elaborated by Fricker, can be narrowed 
to the following:
(1) There is nothing specifically testimonial about Fricker’s depiction of 
testimonial injustice, save for the context in which it occurs – that it is, 
in other words, an instance rather than a kind of identity-prejudicial 
judgment.
(2) There is nothing uniquely epistemic about the operation of identity- 
prejudicial credibility deficit in the context of a testimonial exchange; 
it is rather an application, in an epistemic context, of a priori social 
and cultural prejudices or biases, such as racial or gender prejudice, 
held against others not only as knowers, but more generally as 
humans.
(3) Identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, like identity prejudice itself, is 
not a monolithic phenomenon, which can be accounted for or cor-
rected through normative rules or practices. Moreover, even if the 
underlying prejudice is widespread, particular instances of its occur-
rence, such as in a testimonial encounter, may be differently contex-
tualized according to the individual characters and background 
experiences of relevant hearers and speakers, and their personal 
interactions.
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(4) There is no real evidence that testimonial injustices, or epistemic 
injustices more generally, are self-correctable, or, even if they were, 
that epistemic virtues specifically accessed through the application of 
virtue-epistemological principles are required to correct for them.
Adam Piovarchy (2021) specifically challenges Fricker’s moral distinction 
between what she labels culpable and non-culpable instances of testimonial 
injustice. He suggests that it is not only the judgements of hearers like 
Herbert Greenleaf – those whose social backgrounds deprive them of the 
understanding that they are perpetrating a testimonial injustice – that should 
be deemed non-culpable, but the judgements of all those who lack the social 
capacity to correct, or indeed perceive the need to correct, for their pre-
judices, such as the jurors in Tom Robinson’s trial. His argument is that 
neither the testimonial evaluations of Greenleaf, nor the Maycomb County 
jurors are epistemically blameworthy, because they are not making epistemic 
evaluative judgements. In fact, the whole point is that their minds are so 
socially and culturally distorted that they are unable to make such evaluative 
judgements, however compelling the evidence might have been to an unpre-
judiced hearer. As Fricker herself observed in the case of the Maycomb 
County jurors, for example, ‘they cannot, in the courtroom context, perceive 
Tom Robinson as anything other than a lying Negro’ (Fricker 2007, 36). The 
idea that his version of what happened should be preferred to that of a white 
girl ‘is virtually a psychological impossibility’ and thus bound to make them 
reject Finch’s call to them to do their moral and legal duty. (25)
An alternative view might be that both Greenleaf and the Maycomb 
County jurors are epistemically culpable for discounting evidence purely on 
the basis of identity-prejudicial stereotyping, but the jurors are also morally 
culpable of a dereliction of their legal duty to consider evidence put before 
the court on its merits, and to deliver justice. Greenleaf’s culpability might 
thus be more excusable than that of the jurors. In either case, though, I would 
agree that the notion of any distinction between culpability and non- 
culpability as epistemic in nature seems questionable.
José Medina’s earlier (2011) critique of Fricker’s conception of testimonial 
injustice is much broader than, though to some extent consistent with, that 
of Piovarchy. He argues that Fricker has given too little attention to the role 
of identity-prejudicial credibility excess as a phenomenon and its role in 
deflating the credibility of others. In essence, he appears to see most kinds of 
identity-prejudicial actions as a refraction of social and historical imbalances 
between a society’s ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Consequently, he argues:
The proper analysis of a testimonial exchange requires looking into what 
happens before and after the exchange, looking into what happens in other 
exchanges and in society as a whole. (17)
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Medina argues further that identity-prejudicial credibility excess, contra 
Fricker, is a regular cause of testimonial injustice, making speakers dogmatic 
and bullying, and hearers intimidated and inhibited to the extent that they 
deflate their own credibility and thus wrong themselves.7 Moreover, he 
contends, according members of some social groups disproportionally excess 
credit typically results in members of other groups getting disproportionally 
less credit. Whilst this is plausible, I would not follow Medina so far as to say 
that the operation of these social forces is universal, or automatic. I would 
suggest rather that credibility assessments of speakers, especially in the 
context of face-to-face testimonial exchanges, will typically also involve 
reactions to them as individuals as well as members of groups, though it is 
surely right to say that reactions to speakers as individuals may frequently be 
overwhelmed by reactions to them arising from a priori stereotypical 
prejudices.
Medina therefore looks at the case of Tom Robinson as one which is 
driven by the identity-prejudicial credibility excess attributed to Mayella 
Ewell and her father as members of the privileged white community, rather 
than the identity-prejudicial credibility deficit attributed to Tom Robinson. 
Moreover, like Piovarchy, he regards the comparative credibility differential 
between the two as being already firmly in place before the start of the trial, 
and thus the injustice directed towards Tom being not directed towards him 
specifically as a knower, but rather as a Negro, or more specifically as a Negro 
man charged with raping a white woman. For example, Medina notes, Tom’s 
evidence concerning Mayella’s advances towards him is not so much rejected 
as ‘rendered incredible (in fact almost unintelligible) in that culture’ (Medina 
2011, 25). That the credibility of Mayella and her father, though she is a poor 
witness, must be inflated to the point of unconditional belief, and that of 
Tom deflated to the point of disbelief, is a direct consequence of the ‘social 
imaginary’, as Medina calls it, which comes between the jurors and their 
reason, and make them blind and deaf to the evidence. In fact, Medina 
declares, the jury in the Robinson case were affected not just by blindness 
to the evidence but by ‘meta-blindness’ – blindness to their blindness – in 
contrast to others in the courtroom, most notably the black spectators, who 
were able to see the evidence for what it was. The same, it seems to me from 
Fricker’s account of him, can be said of Herbert Greenleaf. The fact that there 
can be no epistemic middle ground available between those who could see 
and those who were meta-blind, Medina claims, rules out the possibility that 
any epistemic injustice the defendant suffered could have been corrected. 
Corrective action such as Fricker envisages would have required there to be 
some ‘unbiased space’ in which hearers could have engaged with their own 
prejudices on epistemic grounds, such as the weight of evidence, but meta- 
blindness makes this impossible: ‘The jurors’ ignorance of their own pre-
judices – more than the absence of any particular virtue – is what got in the 
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way of epistemic justice’ (30). In other words Medina, like Piovarchy, rejects 
the notion of the injustice in the Robinson case as either testimonially 
related, or epistemological in nature. This seems to me to necessarily imply 
a rejection of Fricker’s thesis of correctability as something which can be 
aimed for or achieved within an epistemological framework.
Medina’s analysis seems plausible to me within the racial context in which 
he puts it, though the conception of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit as 
being typically comparative in nature in all situations is perhaps one that 
would require more detailed analysis. Medina refers to his account as 
a contextualist extension of Fricker’s thesis, which he generally endorses, 
but it seems to me that it is a refutation of at least some of the ideas that are 
central to Fricker’s notion of the problem of testimonial injustice as funda-
mentally epistemological, or epistemologically correctable.
Benjamin Sherman’s critique of Fricker’s thesis of testimonial injustice, 
on the other hand, is psychologically and behaviourally centred, and 
challenges her contention that epistemic justice is a virtue one ‘can and 
should aim for in practice’ (Fricker 2007, 98–99). Virtue theory, he says, 
may appear to some to attractively combine moral and epistemic goodness, 
but it has its disadvantages. Firstly, echoing to some extent the arguments 
of Piovarchy and Medina, Sherman argues that in focusing on individual 
vices and virtues as the centre of moral life, virtue theory ignores the 
constraints imposed by immutable historical situations and social struc-
tures on the exercise of personal virtues. Secondly, he contends that virtue 
theory must claim that there are virtues which are stable – for example that 
an epistemic agent who possesses the virtue of honesty is consistently 
honest across most situations – which isn’t necessarily something one can 
‘aim for’. Virtue epistemology, he notes, is attacked by those who argue that 
situational factors irrelevant to moral and epistemic reasoning ‘have much 
greater impact on human thought than virtue theory can accommodate’ 
(Sherman 2016, 234). One cannot therefore assume that a universally stable 
state of virtue is possible – that someone who is courageous or open- 
minded in some situations, for instance, will be courageous or open- 
minded in others. (235) This, in turn, casts doubt on the notion that 
epistemic virtues are ideal states of mind that can be aimed for. Thirdly, 
Sherman asks, to the extent that testimonial injustices are not committed 
knowingly, how can the psychological ability to recognize and to correct for 
them be developed, given that there is no evidence of which he is aware 
that errors of epistemic judgment are reliably neutralizable by purely 
introspective ‘critical reflection’. In fact, he suggests, though reflecting 
one’s identity prejudices ‘might bring to mind a few errors’ it is more 
likely, on the vast majority of occasions, to reinforce one’s initial value 
judgements, and the more psychologically deeply-rooted the judgment is, 
the more likely it is to be thought fair and accurate on reflection. (238) 
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Moreover, he says, one’s idea of what is virtuous might be erroneous; you 
might for example think it is virtuous to bully your fellow jurors into 
agreeing with what you sincerely but mistakenly believe is the correct 
interpretation of someone’s testimony. In reality, suggests Sherman, most 
people consider themselves just and epistemically responsible, and don’t 
normally defer to the judgements of others if they disagree with them. 
Consequently, though he has no objection to a conception of testimonial 
injustice as mistaken belief, and thus an epistemic vice one might strive to 
avoid, he cannot agree that there must be some virtue-theoretic ideal state 
of being testimonially just, let alone one that can be aimed for.
Sherman concludes that the underlying psychological problem of 
Fricker’s thesis of correcting for testimonial justice is that its prerequisite 
is that the hearer see himself as prejudiced, which is not feasible in the 
case of the deepest-rooted, and often unconsciously held, stereotypical 
prejudices, such as racial and gender prejudice. Unsurprisingly, Sherman 
lines up with the other commentators and indeed Fricker herself, in 
concluding that one cannot correct for prejudices that are so deeply 
embedded as to be unconsciously held, but raises a further objection. 
He argues that Fricker has provided no evidence that there is a corrective 
meta-virtue for identity prejudice – ‘some skill or disposition as avoiding 
prejudices in general’ (244). The mere fact that testimonial injustice might 
be a vice, he declares, does not of itself imply that there must be a virtue 
of testimonial justice which can correct for it. (Ibid.) We can, then, 
perhaps do no more than be vigilant about being vulnerable to prejudice, 
and rely on the best available social and scientific information to identify 
instances of it. Moreover, he argues, since we can’t know that there aren’t 
other, yet unidentified, prejudices with which we may have to deal, we 
can’t ever know that we have attained a general, stable disposition of 
being testimonially just. On the contrary, thinking we have achieved it 
might merely make us complacent and less vigilant about new prejudices. 
Better then, perhaps, to accept that we will sometimes be unknowingly 
testimonially unjust, and try to be vigilant in looking out for, and if 
possible correcting, individual failings on our part. In fact, he suggests, 
the best solution might be simply to abandon virtue-theoretical thinking 
altogether. Fricker’s insights, he argues don’t need a virtue-theoretical 
framework, because all moral theories worry about the harms and injus-
tices she shows as resulting from testimonial injustice, and all theories of 
rationality and epistemic responsibility are on guard against the errors of 
judgment involved. If abandoning virtue theory altogether is unaccepta-
ble, Sherman suggests, we could retain the notion of testimonial injustice 
as a vice, but abandon the notion of testimonial justice as a generally 
attainable virtue.
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In fairness to her, Fricker does at least partially acknowledge the problems 
Sherman highlights. ‘It may be’, she says, ‘that the ever changing and self- 
renewing nature of prejudice in society means that the best we can really 
hope for is to achieve the required social reflexivity of judgment through 
repeated efforts of critical reflection, in which case, in so far as we may 
achieve the virtue [of testimonial justice], our possession of it will not be full 
but partial’ (Fricker 2007, 97). The difference may be one of emphasis: that 
whereas Fricker seems to see the issue in terms of social realities and the 
limits of individual resistance to social pressure, Sherman seems to see it as 
more fundamentally one of human psychology and the limits of 
introspection.
Either way, it seems to be common ground that the barriers to achieving 
testimonial justice are predominantly social and cultural, especially in the 
case of identity-prejudicial judgements that are deeply and widely socially 
and culturally embedded, as in the case of racial prejudice and gender 
prejudice. Correcting for them is consequently not merely a matter of 
moral self-improvement, but of socially and culturally counter-intuitive 
thinking and action – correcting, that is, for one’s own social and cultural 
upbringing and thus in that sense acting against oneself as a ‘social being’. 
I would not say such corrective action cannot be aimed for, but it does seem 
to me to that achieving it represents a considerable challenge.
The above commentaries represent a necessarily limited critical appraisal 
of Fricker’s thesis, but nevertheless raise a range of issues. Bearing them in 
mind, but also following my own reading of Fricker’s account of testimonial 
and epistemic injustice, I now suggest the following answers to the questions 
raised at the beginning of this section:
(1) Testimonial injustice is not a distinct phenomenon, but rather 
a context in which the phenomenon of identity-prejudicial credibility 
deficit manifests itself.
(2) Identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is credibility deflation based on 
an a priori prejudice against the speaker as a person rather than an 
a posteriori prejudice based on an evaluation of the content of the 
speaker’s utterance, and thus not a specifically epistemic phenom-
enon, though the harm it inflicts may be epistemic.
(3) Identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is one form of a more widely 
experienced social and cultural phenomenon of identity-prejudicial 
judgements, which is typically, but not necessarily, derived from the 
social stereotyping of speakers as members of a racial, ethnic, or social 
community or group. However, particular instances of it may also be 
affected by their context, the relative social situations and characters 
of the individual parties, and, in face-to face encounters, their perso-
nal interaction.
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(4) Fricker has not shown how a specifically virtue-epistemological fra-
mework is conceptually or methodologically necessary or desirable for 
the task of self-monitoring and self-correcting for testimonial injus-
tice, or that there is a specifically epistemic virtuous state of being 
‘testimonially just’. More broadly, since stereotypical identity preju-
dice is a social phenomenon, and often held unreflectingly, the extent 
to which it is individually correctable through the application of what 
Fricker calls ‘a distinctly reflexive critical social awareness’ is 
debateable.
Having largely dealt with the issues raised by other commentators which 
seem to me particularly plausible, I will finish by adding some comments of 
my own regarding Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice.
4. Looking Back and Moving On
The term ‘testimonial injustice’, as employed by Fricker, embodies three 
elements. The first of these is what she describes as negative identity- 
prejudicial stereotyping, such as racial or gender stereotyping. The second 
element is where negative identity-prejudicial stereotyping causes one per-
son to give the word of another person less credibility than she otherwise 
would give it. If we pause there, we have the notion of identity-prejudicial 
credibility deficit – deflating a speaker’s credibility as a result of whatever 
identity prejudice we hold against them. This notion is basically descriptive 
in nature – it describes the state of someone who holds a particular prejudice 
applying it in a particular way. The third element though introduces the 
notion of epistemic wronging – of wronging a speaker ‘specifically in her 
capacity as a knower’ (Fricker 2007, 20). In common with most other 
commentators, I have no issue with the first two elements, and fully recog-
nize the importance and value of Fricker’s extremely well-worked explora-
tion of the issues and her conclusions. I do, however, in company with 
Piovorchy, Medina and Sherman, have issues with the third element and 
these are highlighted by Fricker’s use of the cases of Tom Robinson and 
Marge Sherwood.
These cases are undoubtedly powerful but extreme examples of identity 
prejudice at work, and the testimonial encounters they portray are specific in 
two crucial aspects. Firstly, they are cases of competing testimonies, in which 
two different versions of the same event are presented by different speakers 
in circumstances in which one version of the event must be wholly accepted, 
and the other wholly rejected. Moreover, the judgemental dice are loaded, 
since the personal and social consequences for the hearers of accepting one of 
the versions are far more damaging to them than those of accepting the 
other. In the case of Greenleaf, believing Marge means accepting that his son 
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has been murdered and also that he has been cruelly duped by the murderer. 
In the case of the Maycomb County jurors, acquitting Tom Robinson means 
publicly undermining the social structure around which the relationship of 
white people to a black people is founded. Consequently, they are both cases 
in which existing deeply embedded identity prejudices are actually rein-
forced by the circumstances surrounding the testimonial event. Secondly, 
as already noted, in neither case is any serious attempt to evaluate the 
evidence as evidence in an epistemic manner remotely possible, since such 
an evaluation is pre-empted by socially conditioned indefeasible assump-
tions: in the case of Tom, that all negroes are liars, and in the case of Marge, 
that women are emotional rather than rational by nature, and that female 
intuition is by its nature epistemically unreliable. If, therefore, testimonial 
injustice requires the speaker to be wronged specifically in his or her capacity 
as a knower – by way of an epistemically wrongful rejection of his or her 
testimonial utterance – neither Marge Sherwood nor Tom Robinson appear 
to be victims of testimonial injustice, though they are clearly victims of an 
identity-prejudicial disbelieving of their assertions. In other words, both 
scenarios appear to me to be antithetical not only to Fricker’s notion of 
correctability, but more fundamentally to her definition of testimonial injus-
tice, and even her conception of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.
My other issue concerns how Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice 
might work when applied to testimony more generally. As she acknowledges, 
there are many kinds of testimonial encounter, even within the limited 
category of spoken face-to-face testimony. Much of it – almost certainly 
most of it – occurs in everyday requests for information or advice, such as 
requests for travel information or advice regarding the selection of some item 
to purchase, for example, or routine workplace exchanges, in which hearers 
may well be sometimes unreflectively evaluating the information they receive 
in an identity-prejudiced manner. In fact, hearers may already have engaged 
their identity prejudices in the selection of their informant, and thus never 
actually reached the point at which their identity-prejudiced response could 
become epistemic in nature. As Sherman points out, such instances of 
unreflective identity prejudice are also the most difficult to recognize within 
oneself, let alone correct for, and reflecting upon them might not necessarily 
result in them being seen as epistemic vices requiring correction. But I would 
suggest that the difficulty is in reality much greater and more indeterminable 
than even Sherman suggests. Consider, for example, the following scenario:
I visit a car showroom in search of a new car, and, upon entry see the 
model I have in mind, and notice two sales people, one of whom is male and 
the other female. I am keen to know more about the car’s specification and 
performance and instinctively approach the male salesperson, being socially 
conditioned to believe a man will possess more technical knowledge of this 
kind than a woman. However, when I start to interrogate the salesman, he 
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informs me that his colleague ‘knows more about the technical stuff’ than he 
does, and calls her over to talk to me. I accept his word, and after an 
informative conversation, follow his colleague’s recommendation to pur-
chase the vehicle I originally had in mind.
Trying to deconstruct this scenario, it appears that I had initially been 
guilty of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit per Fricker, but identity- 
prejudicial credibility excess per Medina. I had then corrected for it, but 
not through a process of virtuous self-correction. Initially, it was on the 
basis of what the male salesperson I had prejudicially selected told me, so 
I deserve no epistemic credit for my decision to engage with his colleague 
beyond accepting the truth of his utterance, thus arguably reinforcing my 
identity-prejudicial reliance on him. On the other hand, I had thereafter 
accepted my female informant’s advice, so maybe in the end I deserve 
credit for correcting for my originally prejudiced credibility judgment. But 
how far the virtue I have thus acquired is specifically epistemic is still 
unclear. And there again, to what extent was my acceptance of the female 
salesperson’s advice at least in part a result of confirmation bias, since she 
had confirmed my original preference? Moreover, assuming that I do 
decide that I have been guilty of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit and 
must correct for it,andthus consciously choose to approach a female sales-
person on the next similar occasion, am I thereby exercising the virtue of 
testimonial justice, or irrationally according the unknown female sales-
person excess credibility?
The point is that I have no hard and fast answers to these questions. 
Fricker’s thesis, much as I accept its conceptual plausibility, seems to give me 
no practical help in cognitively deciphering the scenario I describe, or 
determining my future actions. That scenario may seem trivial, compared 
to an allegation of rape or murder, but it is surely closer to that in which 
identity prejudice is likely to be played out in everyday life, and thus far more 
relevant to the vast majority of those who are the victims of identity- 
prejudiced judgements. My contention, in other words, is that the price 
that Fricker seems to have paid for building her thesis around the 
Robinson and Greenleaf cases is to have significantly narrowed its scope. 
Consequently, I am inclined to read her book as a valuable and important, 
though to some extent flawed, conceptual analysis, of two egregious illustra-
tions of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, but as far as the wider applica-
tion of her thesis is concerned, to see it more as a valuable introduction to 
a yet to be fully explored, and much more widely experienced, phenomenon 
of identity-prejudicial social judgements in societies generally.
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5. Concluding Remarks
There is little doubt that Fricker’s examination of the pernicious influence 
of identity prejudice on testimonial evaluation is of great significance, and 
notable both in its scholarship and originality. She has valiantly struggled 
with what seems to me to be the dilemma which is at the heart of her 
characterization of the debate, which is whether and how one can tackle the 
irrational behavioural phenomenon of identity-prejudicial credibility defi-
cit by applying the kind of rational solutions offered by epistemic theories 
and methodologies. Ultimately, I believe, that task is in reality not only 
beyond Fricker, but also beyond the exclusive reach of epistemology, and 
indeed philosophy. It probably requires the development of the public will 
and ability, separately in the case of each instance of identity prejudice, to 
invoke changes in collective psychology and social and moral perceptions 
towards its victims, especially when it comes to the most fundamental 
cases, such as racial and gender prejudice. To the extent that such 
a project is feasible, it will probably require the combined attention of 
a whole range of professional disciplines, as well as considerable public 
goodwill, and political and legislative support, over an indeterminable 
period of time. Consequently, I would myself see more benefit in treating 
the problem of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit as being one which is 
not specifically testimonial or epistemic, but rather one of how identity 
prejudice reveals itself more generally in an irrational inability to believe 
the word of others.
Notes
1. I shall mostly refer herein to testifiers as ‘speakers’ and recipients of their 
testimony as ‘hearers’, since a speech act in which a single speaker addresses 
one or more hearers is the form of testimony which is the subject of Fricker’s 
study.
2. Jean Améry spent a year in Berlin, in 1935, where he witnessed the phenom-
enon he describes at first hand, before fleeing Vienna into exile in Belgium, in 
1938. His adopted surname Améry was a francophone anagram of Mayer, his 
original surname.
3. This is not an assessment with which I agree, as will become apparent later in 
this essay, but in the interests of presenting her case fairly, I will follow her for 
now.
4. The version espoused in Coady (1992) that hearers have a general presumptive 
epistemic right, as a default position, and absent any clear evidence to the 
contrary, to believe the testimony of others.
5. The version espoused in Burge (1993) and restated with modifications in 
Burge (1997) that ‘a person is entitled to accept as true something that is 
presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger 
reasons not to do so’ (Burge 1993, 467).
6. See, for example, Lackey (2007), and Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013).
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7. Medina regards identity-prejudicial credibility deficit as necessarily a collective, 
rather than an individual phenomenon.
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